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Doubts About Daubert:
Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case Study
Christopher Slobogin*
Introduction
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
sensibly held that testimony purporting to be scientific is admissible only if
it possesses sufficient indicia of scientific validity.2 In Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael,3 the Court more questionably held that opinion evidence based
on 'technical" and "specialized" knowledge must meet the same admissibility
threshold as scientific testimony.4 This Article addresses the implications of
these two decisions for opinion evidence presented by mental health profes-
sionals in criminal trials.
At first glance, those implications appear to be significant. Daubertinter-
preted Rule 702's requirement that opinion testimony "assist" the factfinder
to mean that testimony offered by experts must be based on "reliable" method-
ology and theory.6 Whether reliability is defined in its scientific sense to
mean consistency of result or, in the sense the Court appeared to use it, to
mean a measure of accuracy or validity,7 much behavioral science testimony
does not fare well under this standard.
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law,
Visiting Professor, University of Southern California Law School I would like to thank Tom
Lyon, Mark Fondacaro, and Joalle Moreno for their useful feedback on this paper.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993) (setting out
requirements for admissibility of scientific evidence).
3. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,150-51 (1999).
5. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads as follows: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702.
6. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (stating that "the trial judge must ensure that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable").
7. Social scientists use the term "validity" to refer to accuracy and reserve the term
"reliability" to refer to consistency of result JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL
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Consider first studies of inter-rater reliability using the relatively refined
criteria found inrecent editions ofthe official Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM), published bythe American Psychiatric Association.8 Althoughinitial
research, conducted in the "laboratory," provided encouraging results,9 field
research indicates that mental health professionals involved in everyday
practice may disagree more than half the time even on major diagnostic
categories such as schizophrenia and organic brain syndrome." Diagnostic
opinions concerning people who are not psychotic are even less reliable in the
scientific sense." The reliability of determinations about symptoms, such as
whether a person is engaging in bizarre thought processes, may be low as
well. 2 Agreement among professionals also is very poor when they try to
explain behavior, both because there are so many competing theories -
Freudian, behavioral, social, and so on13 - and because even within a given
SCIENCE IN LAW 54-55 (4th ed. 1998) (citing David HI Kaye & David A. Freeman, Reference
Guide on Statistics, in REFE ENCEMANUALONSCIENTVIEvIDENCE (1994)). InDaubertthe
Court used the term "reliable" most frequently, but its emphasis on falsifiability and error rates
made clear that it meant that term to refer to accuracy. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; see also
id. at 592-93 (noting "helpfulness is to be determined by] whether the reasoning or meth-
odology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid").
8. AMEICANPsYCHIATRICASSOCIATION,DIAGNOSTICANDSTATSTICALMANuAL(4th
od. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
9. Research using the diagnostic criteria found in the third edition of the DSM reported
reliability rates between 69% and 85% for the major diagnostic categories. AMEMCAN PsYcHI-
ATRiC ASSOCITION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATisTICAL MANuAL 470-71 (3d ed. 1980).
10. See Samuel Fennig et al., Comparison of Faciliy and Research Diagnoses in First-
Admission Psychotic Patients, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1423, 1426 (1994) (showing 57.1%
agreement on schizophrenia); Paul B. Lieberman & Frances M. Baker, The Reliability of
PsychiatricDiagnosis in theEmergencyRoom,36 HosI'. &COMMUrrYPSYCHIATRY291,292
(1985) (showing 41% agreement on schizophrenia, 50% agreement on mood disorders, and
37% agreement on organic brain syndromes).
11. See Liebernan & Baker, supra note 10, at 292 (describing reliability of diagnostic
opinions); Graham Mellsop, The Reliability ofAxis H of DSM-1II, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1360, 1361 (1982) (finding that reliability of personality disorder diagnoses in everyday clinical
settings ranged from 49% for antisocial personality .to 1% for schizoid personality). See
generally David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241
SCIENCE 31 (1988) ("A number of subsequent studies showed that rate of disagreement of
specific diagnostic categories often equals or exceeds rate of agreement").
12. See Michael Flaum etal., TheReliability of'Bizarre"Delusions, 32 COIm4PREHENsIVE
PSYCHIATRY 59, 62 (1991) ("In this study, the interrater reliability of distinguishing bizarre
versus non-bizarre delusions was poor, using an unstructured definition, as well as DSM-ll and
DSM-l-R definitions."); Thomas F. Oltmanns, Approaches to the Definition and Study of
Delusions, inDELUSIONALBZFs 3-11 (Thomas F. Oltmanns & BrendanA. Maher eds., 1988)
(discussing low reliability ofjudgments regarding bizarreness of beliefs).
13. Bruce Ennis & Thomas Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption ofExpertise: Fip-
ping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 719 (1974) (stating that "each school of
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theoretical framework there is considerable dispute.'4 Ifthe question is simply
whether a person is grossly impaired (without reference to a specific diagno-
sis), agreement is much better,'5 but for reasons to be discussed below 6 that
type of assessment may not be particularly helpful to the law.
If reliability is low, validity is suspect as well, because a lack of agree-
ment between two raters means that at least one of them is wrong. Even if
reliability is high,' 7 however, validity may be poor; unanimity of opinion may
hide the fact that all raters are wrong. Unfortunately, the validity ofpsychiat-
ric opinion is hard to gauge. A diagnosis is merely a hypothetical construct;
it lacks clear objective referents.'" Even many symptoms - such as whether
a person is "depressed," "anxious," or suffering from "low self-esteem" - are
unverifiable in the same way a physical fact is because the terms themselves
are so amorphous and subjective.'9 Attempts to explain the causes of behavior
(e.g., unconscious conflicts, chemical imbalances, abuse as a child, relation-
psychiatry has a different view of what mental illness is, how it is caused, and how it should be
treated"). See generally Paul Lazare, Hidden Conceptual Models in Clinical Psychiatry, 288
NEW ENG. J. MED. 345 (1973) (identifying, at most basic level, four models of behavioral
science: medical - in which mental state is caused by biological conditions; psychologic - in
which personality is result of patterns established in youth; behavioral - which sees behavior
and accompanying thoughts as result of specific aversive or reinforcing events, and social -
which focuses on relationships with family, peers and institutions as major influence on mental
condition).
14. The best example of this phenomenon is the extent to which adherents to Freudian
theory have broken into different camps. See generally PHILIP HOLZMAN, PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY (1970) (describing various schools of psychoanalytic theory).
15. For instance, inter-rater reliability on the issue of whether a person is "insane" can be
relatively high. Kenneth K. Fukunaga et al., Insanity Plea: Inter-Examiner Agreement and
Concordance of Psychiatric Opinion and Court Verdict, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 325 (1981)
(finding 92% reliability); Michael R. Phillips et al., Psychiatry and the Criminal Justice System:
Testing the Myths, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 605 (1988) (finding 76% agreement); see also infra
note 125 (describing reliability of clinicians using structured interview format).
16. For instance, such assessments may trench on the ultimate legal issue, see infra note
77, and in any event can generally be made by laypeople without expert assistance. See infra
text accompanying notes 115-19 (discussing incremental validity).
17. Clinical reliability can be improved significantly through use of structured interview
formats. See, e.g., PAMELA TAYLORET AL, Delusion and Violence, in VIOiENCE ANDMENTAL
DisonRnmR DEVELOPMENS NRISKASSESsMENT 161 (John Monahan & Henry Steadman eds.,
1994) (finding roughly 82% agreement using Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule).
18. Stephen Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: AnAnatyss ofMentalHealth
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 607 (1978) ("Unlike much physical disorder that often can be
verified by various tests that measure pathology (whether or not cause of symptom, syndrome,
or condition is known), there is no objective, empirical referent of mental disorder other than
crazy behavior itself.").
19. For instance, over 14 different modifiers of the term "depression" have appeared in
the psychiatric literature. Max Hamilton, Mood Disorders: Clinical Features, in 1 COMPRE-
HENSIVE TExIBooK OF PSYCHiATRY-V 894 (Harold L Kaplan & Benjamin Sadock eds., 1989).
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ship with parents) are even more speculative. Most opinion testimony of this
type is based on untested theories, or theories that have been subjected only
to the most preliminary scientific inquiry.20 Paul Meehl's highly critical
commeit twenty years ago is still true today: "[Miost so-called 'theories' in
the soft areas ofpsychology... are scientifically-unimpressive and techmolog-
ically worthless. '21 In many of these situations, forensic clinicians can at best
offer only "anecdata": information obtained through experience in dealing
with psychological problems, reading about case studies, and extrapolation
from the theoretical speculations of others.
Given these deficiencies in the behavioral sciences, much opinion testi-
mony from psychologists and psychiatrists might be considered "unreliable."'
In any event, this Article will assume that such testimony is frequently of
questionable validity. Yet, it also argues that, in at least one important setting,
that fact should not be a bar to admissibility. My thesis is that when such
testimony concerns past mental state and is proffered by a criminal defendant,
it should be admissible even under the Daubert-Kumho regime that exists in
the federal courts and many state jurisdictions.
In previous scholarship I have offered two reasons for this conclusion:
necessity and voice.' The necessity rationale is well-recognized in evidence
law. For instance, some types of hearsay evidence, although less trustworthy
than other evidence, are admissible nonetheless when the declarant is unavail-
20. As Professor Bonnie and I put it
[T]he central etiological theories and conceptual categories of the clinical behav-
ioral disciplines have not been scientifically validated .... At best, opinions about
psychological processes - beyond merely descriptive observations - are clinical
probability judgments rooted in theoretical constructs that are more or less widely
shared among mental health professionals.
Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the
CriminalProcess: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427,461 (1980).
21. Paul E. Meehl, Theoretical Risks and TabularAsterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and
the Slow Progress of Soft Psychology, 46 J. CONSULTING & CTNICAL PSYCHOL. 806, 806
(1978).
22. At least two commentators, interpreting Daubert to require scientific testing of the
basis of the expert's testimony, have concluded that behavioral science testimony will rarely be
reliable enough to meet that test See Michael . Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony
After Daubert: The "Prestige" Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 875-76 (1996) ("The Court's
opinion read literally would dictate the end of the receipt of psychiatric and psychological
testimony in federal courts."); Michael IL Graham, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.: No Frye, Now What?, 30 CRZM L. BUrL. 153, 162 (1994) ("[The testability or
falsifiability and potential error rate factors for appraising [social science evidence] will rarely
be sufficiently present to meet the Daubert standard.").
23. See generally Christopher SloboginPsychiatricEvidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk
or Not to Junk?, 40 WM & MARYL. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter SloboginPsychiatricEvidence];
Christopher Slobogin, TheAdmissibilit ofBehavioral Science Information in Criminal Trials:
From Primitivism to Daubert to Voice, 5 PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y& L. 100 (1999).
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able.24 The necessity argument in this context is analogous. For legal, psy-
chological, and practical reasons, the defendant himself will often be a poor
source of information about his mental state at the time ofthe offense. Expert
explications ofthat mental state therefore should be permitted. Science-based
expert testimony would be the best method of obtaining this explication, but
scientific inquiry into the type of mental state issues the law allows criminal
defendants to raise is usually quite difficut, if not futile. Thus, I argue that
speculations about the defendant's past mental state that are based on the
specialized knowledge of mental health professionals should be admissible.
The voice argument complements this necessity rationale. Building on consti-
tutional precedent, it contends that criminal defendants should have a special
entitlement to tell their stories using mental health professionals, even when
those witnesses cannot scientifically prove their assertions. Together, the
necessity and voice rationales suggest that "clinical" opinion testimony should
be admissible in this context even if it is not "research-based."
Whether this position can survive in a post-Kumho world is not clear.
Despite its refusal to exempt specialized and technical knowledge from the
reliability inquiry required of scientific knowledge, the majority opinion in
Kumho emphasizes the flexibility oftheDauberttest.' It also clearly contem-
plates that "personal experience" as well as "professional studies" could form
the basis for expert testimony under some circumstances.' Thus, Kumho can
be read to permit expert testimony that is based on anecdata rather than
research. At the same time, Kumho firmly requires that experts demonstrate
the validity of their opinions," which is usually difficult to do without using
some sort of scientific methodology.
Accordingly, this Article pursues a third line of argument for admitting
clinical opinion about past mental state in criminal cases, one that accepts the
Daubert-Kumho holding requiring proof of validity, but that nonetheless tends
24. CHRTOPHER B. MUE.LE & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EvIDENCE 1008 (1999) (ex-
plaining that hearsay exceptions which are based on declarant unavailability allow admission
of statements which "are considered trustworthy, but less so than those that fit the exceptions
in FRE 803 [which do not require declarant unavailability] .... [U'navailability represents a
kind of necessity....").
25. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichacl, 526 U.S. 137,150 (1999) (stating "we can neither rule
out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of [Daubert's factors], nor can we
now do so for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence").
26. See id. at 152 (stating that Daubert gatekeeping requirement "make[s] certain that an
expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field").
27. Id. at 149 (noting thatDaubert "'requires a valid ... connection to the pertinent inquiry
as a precondition to admissibility'" (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.
579,592 (1993)).
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to produce the same result as the necessity and voice arguments. Drawing on
the concept of "incremental validity," I contend that when judging the accu-
racy of a finding is impossible, as is likely to be the case with determinations
of insanity and other past mental state defenses, Daubert-Kumho can and
should be construed to permit any psychiatric testimony that "assists" the trier
of fact in considering legally material psychological factors that might other-
wise not be considered. Although research needs to be conducted to bear me
out, I believe that much of the testimony that mental health professionals
present in criminal cases does provide such incremental knowledge and there-
fore should be admissible in the absence of scientifically-based opinion, so
long as it has a plausible basis in psychological theory.
Parts I and II ofthe Article summarize the necessity and voice arguments
and explore their strengths and weaknesses. These two parts ofthe Article are
an extension of my previous writing in this area. Part III considers the various
ways Daubert-Kumho might be interpreted, with an emphasis on the incre-
mental validity contention. In the course of developing these arguments, this
Article will examine the admissibility ofmany other types ofbehavioral science
testimony, including testimony concerning eyewitness credibility, dangerous-
ness predictions, and psychological correlates of particular events, such as
abuse and rape. The focus of this Article will remain, however, the admissi-
bility of behavioral science testimony offered to prove that the defendant is
not culpable or less culpable due to his mental state at the time of the offense.
Other contexts in which expert psychological testimony is used raise a host of
other scientific and evidentiary issues that are well beyond the scope of this
Article.
I Necessity
The law is interested in a criminal defendant's subjective mental state in
a variety of contexts. The insanity defense s and the diminished capacity (or
lack of mens rea) defenses are the most obvious examples. Additionally, in
many jurisdictions the self-defense, duress, and provocation doctrines, once
28. The American Law Institute's formulation of the insanity defense is as follows: "A
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct orto conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 404(1) (1962). Approximately 20 states use this test, while the rest of the states and the
federal government permit an insanity defense only when the mental disease or defect causes
a "substantial incapacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct" or words to that effect.
GARYB.MELTONETAL.,PsYcHOLOGICALALUAMIONSFOpTHECOURTS: AHANDBooKFOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 193 (2d ed. 1997).
29. Perhaps 25 states permit clinical testimony about whether the defendant had the mns
rea for the crime, although many of these limit such testimony to specific intent crimes or murder
cases. MELTONET AL., supra note 28, at 207.
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objectively defined in terms of whether a reasonable person in the defendant's
position would have so acted, now make relevant the particular defendant's
desires and beliefs at the time of the crime.30 For instance, many states now
recognize that the test for self-defense in a case in which a woman kills a man
who has repeatedly beaten her focuses on what a '"battered woman," rather
than what a "reasonable person," would have done.31 As a normative matter,
many of these developments can be debated.32 The fact remains, however,
that the criminal law has decided to make subjective and quasi-subjective
mental states relevant to the blameworthiness inquiry at trial. At least as
important, diminished responsibility due to mental and developmental prob-
lems has become a very significant mitigating factor at sentencing, particu-
larly at capital sentencing.33
30. According to LaFave & Scott: (1) a "substantial minority" of states have adopted a
version of the American Law Ihstitute's provocation formulation, which reduces murder to
manslaughter ifthe defendant was "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse[,] .. the reasonableness of such explanation
or excuse [to] be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be," MODELPENALCODE § 210.3 (1962); (2) a "few" states
have adopted a version of Model Penal Code § 3.04, which recognizes a defense for use offorce
when the actor believes such force is immediately necessary to prevent use of force against him;
and (3) "a very distinct majority" of states have adopted Model Penal Code § 2.09, which recog-
nizes a defense for a crime committed as a result of coercion "which a person of reasonable firm-
ness in the actor's situation would have been unable to resist" WAYNER. LAFAVE &AUSTINW.
SCOTr JR., CIRBNALLAW § 7.10, at 660; § 5.7, at 457-58; § 53, at436 (2d ed. 1986).
31. See Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence
Law, 46 DUKE L.J 461, 484 & n.77 (1996) (describing statutes addressing battered woman
syndrome).
32. One debate is the traditional one as to whether subjective culpability is a fundamental
requirement of criminal liability. Compare OLvERWENDELLHOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 43
(1881) (arguing that criminal law should "take no account of incapacities, unless the weakness
is so marked as to fall into well-known exceptions, such as infancy or madness") with Jerome
Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COuM. L. Rnv. 632
(1963) (taking opposing view). Another debate is how far subjective liability should be carried
(e.g., should self-defense in battered woman situations be defined in terms of the reasonable
battered woman, the reasonable battered woman with job prospects and self-esteem ofdefendant,
or the honest beliefs and feelings of the woman in question?). See Naomi R. Cahn, The Loose-
ness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77
CoRNLLL. Rnv. 1398, 1415-20 (1992) (discussing several drawbacks to "reasonable woman"
standard). A third debate is whether a particular type of subjective mental state, although
logically relevant to culpability, should nonetheless be declared irrelevant for policy reasons,
such as the negative impact evidence explaining the mental state might have on views about
particular groups in society (e.g., evidence that fear of blacks or gays explains defendant's
actions). See Peter Marguilies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and
Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGEMs L. REV. 45, 62-73 (1998) (describing effects of "identity
impact").
33. Modem capital' sentencing statutes routinely include, as mitigating factors to be
considered by the sentencing body, whether the defendant acted under duress, was under the
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Defendants often rely on mental health professionals to bolster their
claims that they were insane, did not have the requisite intent, felt their
criminal acts were necessitated by the circumstances, or were provoked bythe
victim. Typical testimony in an insanity case might assert that, because of
manic-depressive psychosis (or kleptomania or unconscious conflicts), the
defendant felt "compelled" to commit the crime or found it difficult to appre-
ciate its wrongfulness. 4 In diminished capacity cases, behavioral science
testimony might consist of statements that, because of mental retardation (or
explosive personality or schizophrenia), the defendant was incapable of pre-
meditation at the time of the crime.3" When self-defense or provocation is
asserted, clinical expert opinion might support claims that the defendant's
environment (or biological makeup or childhood) made him abnormally sensi-
tive to the abusive (racist, taunting) actions ofthe victim. 6 And at sentencing,
the gates are opened wide to all sorts of theorizing about why the defendant
committed the crime?
7
influence of extreme mental or emotional stress, or had difficulty appreciating the criminality
of his conduct. See Ellen Fellis Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circum-
stance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COILUM. L. REv. 291,296-98 (1989) (describing wide range
of mitigating circumstances based on mental disorder that are listed in capital sentencing
statutes).
34. See generally United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1983) (involving
defendant charged with embezzlement asserting insanity based on diagnosis of pathological
gambling); United States v. Pollard, 171 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich. 1959) (involving defendant
charged with multiple robberies who claimed insanity based on unconscious guilt feelings);
MELTON ET AL, supra note 28, at 563-66 (presenting and discussing report on Seth Hedges,
defendant charged with attempted rape who claimed insanity based on manic-depressive
psychosis diagnosis); id. at 558-62 (presenting and discussing report on Ed Wertz, defendant
charged with armed robbery who claimed insanity based on post-traumatic stress syndrome
induced by Vietnam War).
35. See generaly, e.g., Commonwealth v. Terry, 521 A.2d 398 (Pa. 1987) (involving
defendant charged with murder who claimed he did not premeditate based on "dyssocial
personality with paranoid hysterical and explosive features"); Johnson v. State, 439 A.2d 542
(Md. 1982) (involving defendant charged with murder who claimed he lacked capacity to
premeditate crime because of mental retardation); People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308 (Cal.
1978) (involving defendant charged with burglary who claimed that because of mental illness
he believed home he entered was his).
36. See generally e.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(involving black defendant charged with killing two whites and wounding two others who
claimed their calling him "nigger," combined with his "rotten social background," provoked
shooting); Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984) (involving juvenile charged with murder
of his father who claimed father's battering of him and his family precipitated event).
37. See generally, e.g., People v. Crews, 522 N.E2d 1167 (Ill. 1988) (involving testi-
mony that defendant's crime was result of intermittent explosive disorder); North Carolina v.
Boyd, 319 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. 1984) (involving capital sentencing testimony that defendant had
suffered repeated deep personal losses, which can often lead to strong feelings of self-destruc-
tiveness as well as desire to harm loved ones as way of destroying part of oneself).
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In an ideal world, this testimony from mental health professionals would
be based entirely on good science. In the real world, we are more likely to get
unscientific, clinical anecdata. This section first demonstrates why anecdata
is so frequently used. It then shows why that fact should lead to a relaxed
admissibility standard for clinical opinion testimony rather than to its exclu-
sion.
A. The Difficulty ofInvestigating Past Mental State Scientifically
Claims about past mental state often seem plausible. They also may be
based on hypotheses that, in theory, are testable (or "falsiflable," to use the
term Daubert made legally famous). In practice, however, Dr. Meehl's
pessimistic assessment of the science underlying behavioral science is particu-
larly apposite in this setting: Claims about past mental states relevant to ex-
culpatory criminal law doctrines are very difficult to confirm or disprove
scientifically.
I previously have advanced two reasons for this conclusion." First, an
assessment of past mental state is more akin to an interpretation than to a
description of an objective fact. This is not a claim that mental states do not
"exist," but rather an assertion that our ability to know what was going on in
someone's mind at the time of a criminal act is severely limited. In contrast
to conduct, mental states are not observable. Even assuming we could some-
how arrange to observe an antisocial act and do so without violating legal and
ethical precepts,39 ascertaining the offender's motivations would be difficult
enough. When we try to reconstruct a mental state, the task is much more
daunting because now we must rely on memory - of either the subject or of
his observers - which will be heavily influenced by assumptions, attitudes,
and beliefs that distort description.40 Science is not well-equipped to evaluate
the ' ruth" of such stories because the objective referent is so elusive.
38. See Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence, supra note 23, at 35-41 (arguing that psychiatric
evidence offered to prove past mental state need only meet general acceptance test).
39. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OFEXPERT TESTIMONY § 1-3A., at 36-37 (1997) ("[R]esearchers studying the battered
woman syndrome cannot simply record the psychological manifestations of violence between
family members without proffering assistance from mental health professionals or reporting the
situation to the appropriate authorities.").
40. As Andrew Tasltz, who adopted a similar position to the one taken here, wrote:
Memory itself is an assertion, a self-report, which we play an active role in
constructing. Our memories never involve solely historical truths, for we seek to
create an account of the past consistent with a preconceived cognitive or moral
scheme. Memory is thus at least partly a created narrative.
Andrew E. TaslitA FerninistApproach to Social Scieniftc Evidence: Foundations, 5 MICE.
J. GENDER & L. 1,19-20 (1998).
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Even if this problem can be overcome, the scientist is confronted by a
serious measurement problem. The insanity defense, mens rea doctrines such
as premeditation and depraved indifference, and inquiries into whether some-
one felt justified in committing crime all require an assessment of the strength
of beliefs or urges.41 Without some gauge of the degree of cognitive and voli-
tional impairment present at the time ofthe offense, a scientific differentiation
between offenders cannot be made on blameworthiness grounds. Unfortu-
nately, there is currently no way to measure the intensity of an 'urge," the
difficulty of accessing the right reasons for action, or the degree to which a
person felt a given action was necessary.4 2 Although scientists may eventually
develop such measures,4 3 the conceptual obstacles are formidable."
Other experimental designs avoid the difficulties associated with pinning
down a person's precise past mental state, but suffer significantly in terms of
"fit," a problem that Daubert itself recognized. 5 For example, scientists
might examine whether people with certain types of conditions are more likely
to commit crime than matched control groups, or whether battered women
who kill their spouses are different in objectively measurable ways than
battered women who leave, rather than kill, their spouses. Neither of these
correlational studies necessarily requires assessment of past mental state. For
that very reason, however, confirmatory findings are unlikely to be useful on
past mental state issues. A finding that people with persecutory delusions, an
41. The insanity doctrine, for instance, requires an assessment of "substantial inability"
to "appreciate" or "control." See supra note 28 (discussing Model Penal Code's formulation
of insanity defense). Provocation doctrine under the Model Penal Code examines whether a
person was under "extreme" mental or emotional "stress." See supra note 30 (noting Model
Penal Code's formulation of provocation doctrine). Self-defense doctrine under the Model
Penal Code asks whether the person believed the crime was "necessary," which requires an
assessment of how strong the belief was. See supra note 30 (describing Model Penal Code's
formulation). , for instance, the actor was aware of a substantial probability that the crime was
not necessary to prevent harm to the actor, then a defense would not lie for crimes which only
require recklessness as amens tea. PAULR. ROBINSON, CRIMINALLAW DEFENSES § 184(eX3),
at 410-14 (1984).
42. See Morse, supra note 18, at 584 (stating "there is no scientific measure of the
strength of urges"); Alexander Rosenberg, The Explanation of Hwnan Action, in PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIAL SCmINCE 47-49 (1988) (describing why measuring "what a person believes by some
distinct effect of the belief, in the way that a thermometer measures heat by its quite distinct
effect... is impossible").
43. See Richard RogersAPA 'sPosition on the InsanityDefense, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 840,
842 (1987) ("[Vjolitional capacity can be conceptualized in terms oftestable criteria.").
44. See Christopher SloboginAn End to Insanity: Recasting the Role ofMentalDisabil-
ity in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000) (exploring difficulties inherent in inquiries
involving past mental state). See infra note 125 for an example of how "unscientific" the state
of the art is today.
45. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) ("[S]cientific valid-
ity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.").
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extra Y chromosome, or a diagnosis of psychopathy commit more crime than
a control group tells us very little about whether the former groups experience
stronger urges or more cognitive impairment at the time of their offense; at
best such results tell us that their condition was a predisposing factor for
crime, just like being a male or being poor is.46 A finding that battered women
with fewer job options are more likely to kill their spouse says nothing about
the extent to which the former group killed out of fear - which might form the
basis for a self-defense claim - or instead out of anger or frustration.47
Analogue research is probably the most fruitful line of scientific inquiry
into past mental state, but it too has significant problems. Such research
might investigate, for instance, the extent to which people with psychosis feel
"compelled" or are confused about right and wrong in non-criminal situations,
compared to a matched control group.' In theory, this type of research could
provide valuable insights into how people with certain traits or experiences -
mental illness, battering by one's spouse, abuse as a child - perceive and react
to events, from which we might be willing to infer perceptions, beliefs, and
feelings during a crime. Moreover, because researchers can collect informa-
tion about mental states at the time they occur (something which is impossible
in the typical crime situation), the memory problem is minimized. However,
the measurement problem still exists. At least as importantly, as with the
correlational research described above, the usefulness of these studies may be
compromised by the lack of fit. How people feel and behave in relatively
46. As Michael Moore pointed out
Everyone is undoubtedly caused to act as they do by a myriad of environmental,
physiological, or psychological factors. Yet to say that any actions are caused,
for example, by an unhappy childhood, a chemical imbalance or a belief that it
is raining, is not to say the actions are compelled.
Michael Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563,1665 (1980).
47. Research suggesting that battered women are economically dependent can help
rebut prosecutorial statements that the woman could have left the battering relationship. See,
e.g., Debra S. Kalmuss & Murray A. Straus, Wife's Marital Dependency and Wife Abuse, 44
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 277,284-85 (1982) (reporting study results that suggest that "wives who
are highly dependent on marriage are less able to discourage, avoid, or put an end to abuse than
are women in marriages where the balance of resources between husbands and wives is more
nearly equal"). But such research is still ambiguous about the relevant mental state. For
instance, from a "rational" point of view, women with no independent economic means would
seem to be the least likely to believe that killing the one person who provides for them is
"necessary."
48. See, e.g., ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATIS, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBHIIY 185-87 (1991) (reporting research indicating that people with schizo-
phrenia have trouble with cognitive focus (e.g., distraction by irrelevant stimuli, thought
blocking); reasoning (e.g., attribution of elaborate meanings to ordinary events); and concept
formation (e.g., tendency to include information in categories to which they bear no relation-
ship)).
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mundane circumstances is unlikely to generalize well to the usually dramatic
and often unique circumstances associated with criminal actions.
49
The fit problem exposes the unusual challenges confronted by those
trying to conduct scientific inquiry into legally relevant past mental states.
Generally, actuarial decision making based on studies of groups (nomothetic
decision making) is more accurate than clinical decision making based on
individualized assessment (idiographic decision making)."0 But that well-
documented finding does not have ready applicability in this context. Re-
search that tells us that certain types of people (battered women with no job
prospects, people with paranoid delusions) are likely to commit violent crime
will probably never tell us very much about cognitive or volitional problems
at the time of an offense."' Research that tells us about the nature of certain
conditions in noncriminal situations (how people with schizophrenia normally
function) comes closer to the mark, but still only permits speculation about
mental states during criminal acts.52 Given its unique flaws, testimony about
49. Consider, for instance, these observations from Stephen Morse:
[E]ven the craziest persons seem to behave quite normally or rationally a great deal
of the time, especially if there is good reason to do so. On at least some occasions,
including some instances when they are behaving crazily, crazy persons are clearly
capable of playing by the usual rules. Nor do they always act on the basis of their
crazy reasons.
Morse, supra note 18, at 587-88.
50. See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction of Human Out-
comes, 243 SCIENCE 1668, 1673 (1989) (reviewing over 100 studies indicating "that a properly
developed and applied actuarial method is likely to help in diagnosing and predicting human
behavior as well or better than the clinical method, even when the clinical judge has access to
equal or greater amounts of information").
51. Some correlational studies do address past mental state directly, but the results still
are a weak fit. For instance, Steury and Choinski found that 22% of patient-defendants and
14% of non-patient defendants used "gratuitous" violence. Ellen Hochstedler Steury & Michelle
Choinski, "Normal" Crimes and Mental Disorder: A Two-Group Comparison ofDeadtv and
Dangerous Felonies, 18 INT'L JL. & PSYCHIATRY 183, 197 (1995). Similarly, Taylor found
that 10% of psychotic individuals who committed crime were "motiveless" compared to 6% of
non-psychotics. Pamela J. Taylor, Motives for OffendingAmong Violent and Psychotic Men,
147 BRIrr. I. PSYCHRATRY 491, 493 (1985). Leaving aside the difficulty of deciding when
violence is gratuitous or motiveless, these types of findings are almost useless as a way of
determining mental state in an individual case, both because the percentage of patients who
committed crime gratuitously or without motive is so small and because of the small differences
found between the experimental and control groups. An expert in a case involving an ex-patient
could say, based on the Steury and Choinski study, that patients are twice as likely as non-
patients to engage in gratuitous violence, but that and similar conclusions that could be drawn
from the study are probably more misleading than helpful on issues like insanity or intent
52. Cf Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, andBehavioralBiology, 39 JURIMEIRICS J. 283,
285 (1999) ("With rare exceptions... predispositions ... do not enable confident predictions
about how any single person will in fact behave in the future, or inferences as to why an indiv-
idual behaved as she did in the past").
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past mental state based on analogue and other types of "scientific" studies may
turn out to be much less useful than idiographic testimony based on anecdata
and speculative theory, not just in terms of fit but also in terms of accuracy. 3
None of this is meant to suggest that scientific research about past mental
state is impossible, should not be attempted, or should be automatically
excluded from the courtroom on lack of reliability or lack of fit grounds. It
does suggest that "hard" scientific evidence that directly addresses the issues
raised by criminal defense doctrines is unlikely to be produced in the near
fiture. As Dr. Meehl concludes:
It may be that the nature of the subject matter in most ofpersonology and
social psychology is inherently incapable ofpermitting theories with suffi-
cientconceptualpower(espedallymathematicaldevelopment)to yieldthe
kinds of strong refiters expected by Popperians, Bayesians, and unphilo-
sophical scientists in developed fields like chemistry.m
More specific to the issues addressed in this Article are the comments of
Thomas Grisso, who has examined the scientific basis of forensic psychology
in a number of areas.55 Singling out criminal responsibility assessments as a
particularly primitive research domain, he concluded four years ago that
"[tlhere is little reason to believe that past meager advances in performing
evaluations for criminal responsibility will be augmented in the near future,"
both because the relevant "theoretical and operational definitions are difficult
to identify' and because "we have not yet demonstrated our ability even to
make... basic retrospective inferences [such as whether the defendant was
under the influence of a mental disorder at the time of the offense] reliably
and validly."56 My own conclusion in earlier work was that "'research relevant
to past mental state... is so likely to be tainted by methodological problems
that, in effect, it is no different from interpretation and story-telling.0
7
53. Dr. Mccli states that when trying to explain behavior, "I would take Freud's clinical
observations over most people's t tests [tests of statistical significance] any time." Meehl, supra
note 21, at 817. Given the fact that Dr. Mechl is a long-time advocate of scientific investigation
and that Freudian psychodynamics has been called one of the "best examples" of unfalsifiable
theory, Ralph Underwager & Hollida Wakefield, A Paradigm Shift for Expert Witnesses, 5
ISSUES iN CanD SEXABUSEACCUSATIONS 156,158-59 (1993), this is a remarkable statement,
to say the least
54. Mechl, supra note 21, at 829. Meehl describes 20 "difficulties in scientizing the
human mind" that have only been alluded to here. Id. at 808-17.
55. See generally THOMAS GRisso, EVALUATING CoMWETENcIEs: FORENsIC AssEss-
MENTS AND INsTRUMENTS (1986) (discussing processes for evaluating competency in suchareas
as parenting, need for guardianship, insanity, and competency to stand trial).
56. Thomas Grisso, Pretial Clinical Evaluations in Criminal Cases: Past Trends and
Future Directions, 23 CRIM. JUsT. &BEHAV. 90,97-98 (1996).
57. SloboginPsychiatric Evidence, supra note 23, at 40.
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B. The Case Against Exclusion
Useful scientific research on the types of past mental state issues that are
raised by the criminal law is scanty, and that situation is unlikely to improve
substantially in the foreseeable future. 8 Acceptance of that assertion does not
require the admission of nonscientific opinion evidence on past mental state,
of course. Jurisdictions which apply Daubert-Kumho have two choices with
respect to such evidence. They can either make accommodations for it
(through an exception to Daubert-Kumho or a flexible interpretation of it), or
they can prohibit it. There are at least four possible reasons for taking the
latter approach, but none of them withstand analysis.
The first argument is that, without such a prohibition, there is no incen-
tive even to attempt truly scientific investigation of past mental state. 9 Why
go to the trouble of grappling with the methodological obstacles described
above ifjudges are willing to admit more speculative opinion? This argument
assumes, of course, that true scientific research relevant to past mental state
is feasible and that its results will be superior to clinical anecdata. This
Article questions both assumptions. Even granting both assumptions, how-
ever, the argument exaggerates the power of the courts and the gullibility of
legal factfmders. The courts are seldom the only market for scientific re-
search relevant to past mental state. For instance, vigorous study of battered
women and of mentally ill people who are violent has occurred independently
of any demands by the criminal defense bar and despite judicial acceptance
of opinion evidence on those topics. ' And in those few instances where
evidence of past mental state is custom-made for the courtroom, the skepti-
cism of judges and juries provides a powerful inducement to base it on solid
grounds. Rarely noted by those who bemoan 'junk" testimony in criminal
cases is the fact that legal decisionmakers are virtually never impressed by
novel syndromes that have little basis in logic or the literature.6' To the extent
58. One group of commentators noies that every field poses formidable research tasks.
They point out that "[o]ur inability to 'see' an electron, for example, does not foreclose a rig-
orous examination of its existence, nature, and form," and that "[d]iffi cult and complex theories
require more imaginative research designs." 1 FAIGMA. ET AL., supra note 39, § 1-3.5, at 37.
Accepting the notion that we may eventually be able to research past mental state effectively,
the question addressed in this Article is what to do in the meantime.
59. David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert" Is It
"Scientifc," 'Technical," or "Other" Knowledge, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 960, 971-77
(1995).
60. See supra notes 47 and 51 (noting some studies relevant to assessing mental state).
See generally Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence:
A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993) (canvassing
recent research on social context of battering and diverse responses to battering).
61. See Peter Arenella, Demystifing the Abuse Excuse: Is There One?, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 703,703-05 (1996) (noting that successful "abuse excuses" are very rare and that
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it is possible, scientific inquiry into past mental state will and should be
carried out independently of the courts' rulings on its admissibility.
A second possible argument for prohibiting opinion evidence about past
mental state involves assuring adversarial equipoise. Given the fact that
insanity, dirmnished capacity, and other past mental state doctrines are de-
fenses, only the defendant is likely to present expert evidence of past mental
state in his case-in-chief. In contrast, the type of behavioral science testimony
the prosecution is most likely to offer in its case-in-chief consists of assertions
that the defendant meets a criminal "profile" (e.g., a constellation of traits
characteristic of a battering parent or rapist).62 Because the latter evidence
aims at proving the act element rather than the mental state element of the
crime, its admissibility would not be analyzed under the relaxed evidentiary
standard proposed here. Yet that result might strike some as unfair, because
it seems to favor the defense over the prosecution.
If one agrees with the previous assertions about the unique difficulties of
researching past mental state, however, an imbalance in the admissibility
thresholds for past mental state and profile evidence makes sense. The re-
search necessary to construct a criminal profile does not rely on ascertaining
amorphous mental states at the time of a crime, but rather links observable acts
(e.g., rape) with other observable events or current mental states (e.g., abuse
as a child; previous rapes by the offender; lack of remorse). In other words, it
conforms to the typical scientific research model attempting to predict a given
type of behavior. Thus, this type of behavioral information is eminently more
scientifically testable and should not be evaluated under a relaxed admissibil-
ity standard, at least on necessity grounds. It also should be noted that, inthose
rare instances when prosecutors rely on opinion evidence about past mental
state, as they do when proffering expert testimony about rape trauma syn-
drome, 3 the necessity rationale advanced here would apply to the prosecution
as well. By the same token, when the defense relies on expert testimony to
typically only those claiming insanity are eligible to be excused under abuse excuse theories);
Richard J. Bonnie, Excusing and Punishing in Criminal Adjudication: A Reality Check, 5
CORNELL JJL. & PuB. POL'Y 1, 3-4, 15 (1995) (describing lack of success of novel psychiatric
defenses in several cases); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Fault Lines: Has a Talk-Show Mentality
Softened Jurors to Accept Any Excuse?, A.B.A J., June 1994, at 40, 42 (indicating such
defenses are usually unsuccessful).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475,479-81 (9th Cir. 1988) (involving
testimony on "characteristics common to child molesters"); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827,
828-29 (Fla. 1993) (involving testimony based on "sex offender profile").
63. Rape trauma syndrome evidence is presented to show - either directly or indirectly -
that the alleged victim of a rape did not consent to intercourse with the defendant See gener-
ally, e.g., People v. Taylor, 552 N.E2d 131 (N.Y. 1990) (involving two cases, one in which
syndrome was proffered to show rape actually occurred and other to explain conduct of victim
(e.g., failure to report after alleged incident)). Thus, it is introduced to show the victim's mental
state - consent or lack thereof- at the time of the alleged crime.
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suggest the defendant did not commit the act,' it would not be exempted from
a strict application of Daubert-Kumho. The fulcrum of the necessity rationale
is the type of testimony proffered, not the party proffering it.
The final two arguments in favor of excluding clinical opinion testimony
directly confront the necessity rationale for its admission. That rationale, it
will be remembered,65 traditionally applies only to evidence that is necessary
andhas some indicia of reliability. The third argument against clinical opinion
testimony is simplythatit has inadequate guarantees oftrustwortbiness.' The
shortest response to this argument (and the only one this Article will advance)
is that, for the same reason an opinion about past mental state cannot be scien-
tifically proven correct, it cannot be scientifically proven incorrect. 7 Instead,
the law must rely on assessment of the expert's credentials, experience,
evaluative process, and theoretical plausibility in determining whether his or
her opinion is sufficiently trustworthy. A clinician who has had forensic
training, been involved in multiple criminal responsibility assessments, con-
ducted a thorough evaluation ofthe defendant and relevant third party informa-
tion, and read the relevant literature should generally be considered to have
sufficient specialized knowledge to address criminal responsibility issues.s
64. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 227-28 (4th Cir. 1982) (up-
holding trial court's exclusion of expert testimony that defendant's personality was inconsistent
with senseless murders of his family).
65. See supra text accompanying note 24 (noting necessity as rationale for admitting
evidence).
66. See Faust & Ziskin, supra note 11, at 31 (arguing that most, if not all, testimony
offered by psychologists and psychiatrists should be excluded from courtroom because it cannot
be offered with "reasonable medical certainty" - which they translate as "pretty likely accu-
rate" - and because it does not improve validity offactfinder's decision).
67. Of course, if science shows that clinical speculation is wrong, then that speculation
should be prohibited. Making such a showing is usually difficult, however. Some have claimed,
for instance, that the "learned helplessness" theory that underlies some testimony in battered
women cases is seriously flawed. See David L. Faigman, The Syndromic Lawyer Syndrome:
A Psychological Theory ofEvidentiaryMunificence, 67 U. CoLO. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1996)
(attacking battered woman's syndrome as "pseudoscientific social science"). There is no doubt
it is, as a scientific matter. But the scientific jury may still be out as to whether it is clearly
wrong. See Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the
Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. I.L L. REV. 45, 64 ("Collectively, the
data reviewed supports the proposition that battered women do not suffer learned helplessness,
at least as well as it supports the claim that they do.").
68. Professor Bonnie and I discussed various safeguards that might be taken with respect
to training and evaluation procedures. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 496-520; see also
United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337,1342-43 (7th Cir. 1996) (laying out minimum requirements
for expert opinion based on social science, including testimony concerning literature on topic,
methods of peer review, and quantity and quality of observational and other studies); MELTON
ET AL, supra note 28, at 235-41 (describing procedure for performing criminal responsibility
evaluations).
DOUBTSABOUT DAUBERT
The fourth and most powerful argument in favor of prohibiting qualified
opinion testimony about past mental state is that juries and judges do not need
it. 9 There are at least two other sources of information about past mental
state. The first is lay testimony, primarily from the defendant himself. The
second is expert testimony that eschews opinion and is devoted solely to
providing relevant psychological "facts."
The most obvious source of information about past mental state is the
defendant himself. Reliance on this source, however, is problematic for
several reasons. First, the Fifth Amendment may prevent compulsion of the
defendant's testimony.7" Second, defendants asserting past mental state
defenses often have difficulty communicating; although they must be compe-
tent to stand trial,7 ' their abilityto recount their feelings and beliefs at the time
of the offense will often be compromised. 2 Third, and most important, even
fully competent defendants may not be aware of, or may be unwilling to admit
to, crucial aspects of their past mental state. For instance, defendants may not
suspect the effects of biological, childhood, and situational variables on their
behavior,73 or they may deny they have mental or relationship problems that
in fact explain their behavior. 4 The best way to obtain all the relevant facts
69. The most forceful proponent ofthis position is Morse, supra note 18, at 601-24.
70. Most courts hold that the defendant may be compelled to undergo evaluation on past
mental state issues once a defense has been raised, usually on the ground that raising a defense
waives the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith:
Constitutional Contours of the Forensic Evaluation Process, 31 EMORY L.. 71, 97-98 (1982).
But at least some courts also appear to take the position that asserting the defense does not also
waive the defendant's right to refuse to testify. See State v. Humphrey, 845 P.2d 592, 599-601
(Kan. 1992) (finding error in court's refusal to allow psychiatrist to testify because defendant
had asserted right to refuse to testify). Of course, if expert testimony is banned many defendants
might decide to testify despite the drawbacks identified in the text
71. See generally Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) (requiring criminal defendant
to be competent to stand trial).
72. The threshold for competency to stand trial is not very high. See Note, Incompetency
to Stand Trial, 81 HARv. L. REv. 454, 459 (1967) (noting that, despite fairness concerns,
enlarging class of people found incompetent to include all defendants who "lack the intelligence
or the legal sophistication to participate actively in the conduct of their defense.. . would
fundamentally alter the administration ofthe criminal law"). Cf. MELTONET AL, supra note 28,
at 135 (reporting research finding that only about 10% of those considered mentally disabled
enough to be referred for competency evaluation are found incompetent).
73. After all, the central premise of psychotherapy is that patients need the therapist's help
in discovering their motivations.
74. For instance, people with schizophrenia are often said to "lack insight" into their
condition. DSM-IV, supra note 8, at 279 ("Lack of insight is common [among people with
schizophrenia]."). Another problem is amnesia. Se.e generally John Bradford & Selwyn Smith,
Amnesia and Homicide: The Padola Case and a Study of Thirty Cases, 7 BULL AKA ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 219 (1979) (finding 60% of defendants studied claimed amnesia); Pamela
J. Taylor & Michael L. Kopelman, Amnesia for Criminal Offenses, 14 PSYCHOL MED. 581
(1984) (finding 23% claimed amnesia).
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about past mental state is to rely on mental health professionals, who have
special training in and skill at eliciting information from incompetent, reluc-
tant, or oblivious subjects.7 5
This latter ability suggests a second source of information about past
mental state other than opinion testimony. Psychiatric testimony, like any
expert testimony, can be conceptualized in terms of multiple levels of infer-
ence, with each succeeding level incorporating a greater degree of generaliza-
tion. Imagine, for instance, a case in which a forensic clinician conducts an
interview of a defendant charged with assault. The defendant's attorney is
asserting an insanity defense, in large part because the victim of the assault
swears he does not know the defendant, was not aware ofhis presence until the
assault occurred, and has no idea why he was attacked. During the interview,
the defendant appears to think he is talking to people who in fact are not there,
makes irrelevant and incomprehensible statements under his breath, and insists
that the person he assaulted was an "archfiend" who was trying to hurt him.
Based on this information, the clinician might infer: a particular symptom-
ology (the defendant was delusional at the time ofthe offense); a diagnosis (the
defendant was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the offense); the
presence of legally relevant impairments (the defendant thought killing the
victim was justified); and an ultimate legal conclusion (the defendant was
insane at the time of the offense). Psychiatric testimony today often includes
all five levels of testimony (the fhcts plus the four levels of inference). One
might argue, however, that a factfinder trying to determine the defendant's
sanity does not need the inferential testimony. The mental health profes-
sional's factual information about the defendant's behavior during the inter-
view (together with any third party observations) is probably crucial, but the
rest ofthe expert's testimony-the "opinion! - might be considered surplusage.
Perhaps, as Justice Stewart said about obscenity, 6 laypeople know "crazi-
ness" when they see it and do not need expert aid. Even in the simple example
given here, however, consider how much more the jury could be offered by
a seasoned forensic clinician. First, such an expert could help the jury decide
whether to believe the defendant's report about the offense. The expert might
be able to relate, based on his or her own experience and any analogue studies
that exist, that people with schizophrenia often erroneously believe people
want to hurt them and that they have difficulty attending to countervailing
facts. The expert also could describe why he or she thinks the defendant is
75. Even Morse, generally skeptical of claims of specialized knowledge by forensic
mental health professionals, believes that they may possess relatively greater skill at interview-
ing and ascertaining mental facts. See Morse, supra note 18, at 611 ("Because experts interact
with all types of crazy persons far more often than laypersons, they may be especially sensitive
to or inquire about behavior that would go unnoticed by laypersons.").
76. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), Justice Stewart stated that, although he
couldn't define obscenity, "I know it when I see it" Id. at 197 (concurring opinion).
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suffering from schizophrenia, a description necessary to make the experience
and analogue studies relevant. Finally, the expert can conjecture, based on
experience with mentally ill people, about the strength of the defendant's para-
noia and the nature of his thought process at the time of the offense." This
information - much of it anecdata or idiographic in nature - is speculative, but
it is also plausible and not clearly wrong, given the vagaries of pinning down
a person's past mental state. A rigid interpretation of Daubert-Kumho, how-
ever, might bar all of this testimony to the extent it is based on experience,
potentially unreliable diagnoses such as schizophrenia, or assertions about
degrees of impairment.
In other less typical cases (but precisely the types of cases that go to trial,
rather than end up resolved through plea bargaining) an account limited to the
bare facts may be even less edifying. My coauthors and I have described
elsewhere cases involving a man with no prior history of crime or mental
illness who conmitted a gruesome sexual assault," a man who claimed he
killed his employer after he argued with him because "devils" in his head
commanded him to do so,79 and a woman who claimed that she did not realize
a check she cashed was forged because she believed her boyfriend's statement
that the check was legitimate. 0 In such cases, as suggested earlier, defendants
relegated to simply stating their counterintuiive and self-serving claims about
their mental state, without supporting expert testimony as to why those claims
might make clinical sense, are prevented from providing the most plausible,
coherent interpretation of their conduct." Nor does nomothetic information
77. Whether the expert should be allowed to address the ultimate legal issue, despite its
normative (nonpositivist) nature, is a complicated subject not addressed here. Generally, such
testimony should be avoided because it involves experts in conjecture beyond their areas of
expertise. See generally Christopher Slobogin, The "Ultimate Issue"Issue, 7 BEHAV. SCL & L.
259 (1989).
78. MELTONET AL.,supra note 28, at 245-46. The defendant, among other things, spoke
in an unusual voice during the act and referred to himself as a Mexican "stud" even though he
was Caucasian. We describe a psychodynamic explanation for the rape, based on the defen-
dant's relationship with his mother. Id.
79. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 486-88 (describing expert testimony in People
v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492 (Cal. 1959), that defendant would have psychically disintegrated had
he not committed crime).
80. Id. at 477-79 (describing expert testimony in United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584
(2d Cir. 1975), that defendant was passive-dependent personality who was likely very gullible
about statements made by loved ones).
81. For instance, in Gorshen, the trial judge stated that "up till the time that [the defense
expert] testified in this case there was no explanation for why this crime was committed. [He
is] the first person that has any reasonable explanation. Whether it's correct or not, I don't
know." Gorshen, 336 P.2d at 497; see also Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 488 n.192.
At the same time, mental health professionals and judges should be cautious about such explan-
ations.
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(on those rare occasions when it fits the situation) remedy the problem; such
testimony ultimately consists of information about others, not about the
defendant. At bottom, then, the response to the position that non-inferential
testimony is all that the factfinder requires is that such a rule deprives defen-
dants of their ability to relate their story. As the next section explains, that
result may well violate the Constitution.
If. Voice
Rock v. Arkansasm is Exhibit A in support of the argument that the Con-
stitution guarantees defendants the opportunity to explain their mental state
at the time of the offense even when they do so using expert testimony that
has not been scientifically verified.' In Rock, the Supreme Court affirmed the
criminal defendant's right (under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments) to testify. More specifically, it struck down an Arkansas statute that
banned defense use of the defendant's hypnotically-induced testimony unless
the state could show that such testimony "is always so untrustworthy and so
immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable
a defendant from presenting her version of the events for which she is on
trial."" Rock is a strong statement that criminal defendants, presumed inno-
cent and facing harsh punishment ifthe state succeeds in its efforts to convict,
must be given license to produce evidence on their behalf. Only completely
unreliable evidence, or suspect evidence which cannot be exposed for what it
is through the usual adversarial vehicles of cross-examination and rebuttal
witnesses, may be excluded when proffered through the defendant. Because
qualified opinion evidence about past mental state is not completely untrust-
worthy and because its weaknesses are neither impervious to challenge or
incapable of being understood by laypeople, it should be admissible under the
spirit of Rock.
In spite of their intuitive appeal and apparent usefulness,... psychodynamic formu-
lations cany considerable risks when applied to criminal behavior. One problem
is that psychodynamic explanation can be generated to explain virtually every
human behavior .... A second problem with such theorizing is that it is usually
highly speculative .... Given the problems associated with such formulations, we
[recommend] that psychodynamic opinions that attempt to explain behavior be
advanced only when an analysis of a defendant's conscious reasons and motivations
for a criminal act ... fails to provide a satisfactory understanding of the crime
scenario.
MELTONET AL., supra note 28, at 246.
82. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
83. See generally Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding Arkansas rule excluding
all hypnotically refreshed testimony unconstitutional).
84. Id. at 61.
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The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Scheffer,85 which
twelve years after Rock permitted exclusion of defense-proffered polygraph
evidence on the grounds of unreliability, is readily distinguishable. There the
Court bolstered its holding by emphasizing that polygraph evidence is likely
to be seen as infallible by the jury, 6 trenches upon the jury's role as credibil-
ity assessor s and merely affirms, rather than comprises, the defendant's
story.8 Opinion testimony about past mental state, in contrast, is viewed with
skepticism by laypeople,"9 only indirectly vouches for the defendant's credi-
bility, and is an integral part of the defendant's version of events when a
mental state defense is asserted. Squelching such testimony would commit the
constitutional sin of precluding the defendant from exercising "his choice to
convey his version of the facts," which Rock identified and Scheffer af-
firmed?0
One might object that this reading of Rock is too broad. All Rock explic-
itly established was that the state may not prevent the defendant himself from
testifying; preventing his expert mouthpiece from doing so may not be uncon-
stitutional, at least if reliability concerns exist. But that objection is difficult
to square with a third Supreme Court decision, this one directly involving use
of behavioral science expertise. In Barefoot v. Estelle, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the Constitution prohibits psychiatric testimony that
a capital defendant is dangerous, even when it is assumed that such testimony
is wrong two out of three times. Presaging its decision in Rock four years
later (albeit doing so on behalf of the prosecution), the Barefoot majority
stated, 'We are not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable
and that the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to
85. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
86. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1998) (noting that jurors may "give
excessive weight to the opinions of the polygrapher, clothed as they are in scientific expertise").
87. See id. at 313 ("By its very nature, polygraph evidence may diminish the jury's role
in making credibility determinations .... [A] polygraph expert can supply the jury only with
another opinion, in addition to its own about whether the witness was telling the truth.").
88. See id. at 317 (excluding polygraph evidence does not prevent defendant from
introducing "factual evidence" or "exercis[img] his choice to convey his version of the facts,"
but rather bars defendant "merely from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own
credibility").
89. Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and ExpertEvidence: Social Framework
Testimony, 1989 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 133,173 (reporting research thatjurors do not treat
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome, rape trauma syndrome, and eyewitness reliabil-
ity with unwarranted aura of accuracy).
90. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 316 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,52 (1987)).
91. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
92. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899-901 & n.7 (1983) (allowing expert testi-
mony predicting future dangerousness in spite of testimony about error rate of such predictions).
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uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings."' If the prose-
cution is permitted to offer behavioral science testimony that is probably
inaccurate in 65% of the cases, then certainly the defense should be able to
present most types of opinion testimony on past mental state.'
Perhaps, in light of Daubert and Kumho, the Court will rethink its
approach to dangerousness testimony and explicitly limit Rock's holding to
testimony from the defendant's own mouth. If it does so, the voice argument
loses its constitutional pedigree. 95 However, neither the voice argument nor
the necessity rationale would lose their logical force. If the criminal law
makes subjective mental states relevant, the courts should not prevent the
criminal defendant from using nonscientific evidence to tell his story when
scientific evidence is unavailable. Thus, regardless of the Court's ultimate
stance on the constitutional issues, it is worth considering whether Daubert-
Kumho can be interpreted to recognize the relaxed evidentiary standard that
the necessity and voice considerations suggest should apply to past mental
state opinion evidence.
M1!. Daubert Redux
Somewhat surprisingly, Daubert initially had little impact on the admissi-
bility of behavioral science testimony in criminal cases. Despite the suspect
reliability of such testimony, the proportion of cases in Daubert jurisdictions
admitting expert evidence about such subjects as mental disorders, syndromes,
intent, dangerousness, and child sex abuse victims either remained the same
or actually increased in the first five years after that decision as compared to
the five years prior to Daubert.96 Most courts, perhaps influenced by neces-
93. Id. at 899. Although Barefoot involved testimony at sentencing, when courts tradi-
tionally relax evidentiary rules, the Court has made clear that capital sentencing procedures
should mimic trial in most respects. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99
(1983) (recognizing that "qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination").
94. Indeed, under the necessity analysis outlined above, if a distinction is to be made
between the two types of testimony, dangerousness testimony proffered by the prosecution is
more justifiably subjected to strict scrutiny, because it can be based on research correlating risk
factors with observable events (reoffending).
95. That pedigree may be further weakened by United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317
(1992) (holding that defendants may not avoid hearsay rules with argument that they should be
able to present any evidence on their behalf), and the probability that a state could impose
stringent limitations on both state and defense experts without violating the logic of Barefoot,
463 U.S. at 896-903 (which only held that Constitution is not violated by dangerousness
testimony proffered by state), or Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-56 (1987) (which, by
hypothesis, only applies to testimony from defendant himself).
96. Donald N. Bersoffet al., TheAdmissibility ofPsychologicalEvidence Six Years After
Daubed: Floodgates or Gatekeeping, presentation at American Psychology-Law Society
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sity and voice considerations, avoided taking a hard look at the scientific
credentials of psychiatric opinion evidence, either by explicitly classifying it
or by implicitly treating it as specialized knowledge, thus exempting it from
Daubert's threshold for "scientific" testimony.
97
After Kumho that tactic is no longer available, at least in federal court.
Daubert's reliability requirement now clearly applies to all expert testimony.
The question remains as to how courts should define reliability in the criminal
context.
A. Possible Definitions ofReliability
To this point, this Article has assumed that reliability means validity or
accuracy, and that accuracy is to be gauged primarily through the scientific
method. Even if that is a correct assessment of the Daubert-Kumho holding,
much ambiguity exists. Both Daubert and Kumho stressedthe "flexibility" of
the reliability test and the fact that the four indicia of reliability listed in
Daubert - falsifiability, error rates, peer review, and general acceptance - are
not exclusive." As noted earlier, Kumho also clearly contemplates that expert
testimony may be based on "experience" as well as on scientific research.9
A fair reading of the holdings, then, is that some concrete proof of reliability
is an absolute prerequisite to admissibility, but that a specific quantum of
reliability has yet to be mandated.
The most rigorous definition of reliability would preclude admissibility
unless there is strong scientific proof of accuracy. Under this definition, the
proponent of the evidence would need to show the expert's theory has been
borne out by controlled testing, that the expert's methodology produces low
error rates, and so on. This Article has assumed, for discussion purposes, that
this version of Daubert-Kumho's reliability test is the correct one. However,
there are at least three other possible definitions.
First; reliability requirements could fluctuate with the relevant standards
of proof. Under this regime, the prosecution would often have to meet a
higher reliability threshold than the defense, because it must prove the actus
reus and mens rea elements beyond a reasonable doubt while the defense
need only create a reasonable doubt." This approach, however, violates a
meeting, New Orleans, March 4,2000 (study of all appellate cases decided from five and one-half
years prior to Daubert to five and one-half years afterDaubert) (data on file with author).
97. See id. (noting that out of 428 appellate cases involving psychologicaltestimony, only
17 referred to falsifiability and only 13 referred to error rate).
98. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993); Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,150 (1999).
99. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151.
100. See generally In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring as constitutional man-
date reasonable-doubt standard of criminal law).
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basic tenet of evidence law, most pithily expressed in the phrase "a brick
is not a wall."'' If the prosecution has to certify that each piece of evi-
dence it presents is accurate beyond a reasonable doubt, very little evidence
of any type could be introduced by the state. Such a regime could work undue
hardship on defendants as well. Inmanyjurisdictions, the burden with respect
to the sanity issue is on the defendant,"° and in a few of these jurisdictions
the standard of proof in such cases is clear and convincing evidence. 3
Similarly, the defense may bear the burden in self-defense cases. Although
some courts have ruled that the prosecution must bear the burden of disprov-
ing justification beyond a reasonable doubt,' 4 a self-defense claim based
simply on an honest belief of necessity is, in effect, an excuse much closer in
nature to an insanity defense than to the justification doctrine; 05 at least in
these cases, the Constitution's mandate as to where the burden should lie is
not at all clear.
Another construction of the reliability concept, which can be derived
from Federal Evidence Rules 401, 702, and 403 (defining relevance, expertise,
and factors that allow exclusion of relevant evidence), is that the reliability
of evidence should be judged in conjunction with its materiality, helpfulness,
and accessibility. As I have argued elsewhere," if evidence bears a strong
logical relationship to the proposition to be proved, tends to be counter-
intuitive, and is not likely to overawe the jury, then a relatively low reliability
threshold may be appropriate (especially if high reliability is impossible for
the reasons discussed earlier). Opinion evidence about mental state may be
suspect, but it is usually highly material and, as both Rock and Barefoot noted,
weaknesses in such nontechnical testimony usually can be exposed through
cross-examination and rebuttal witesses." Finally, as earlier discussion
101. CHARES TiFORD MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OFEVIDENCE 316 (1954).
102. See MELTONETAL,supra note 28, at 202 (finding approximatelytwo-thirds of states
place burden of proving insanity on defendant). Placement of the burden on the defendant was
upheld against due process challenges in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), and Rivera
v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
103. See, e.g., 18 U.S.CA. § 17(b) (West WESTLAWthroughAug. 9,2000); ARIZ. REv.
STAT. § 13-502 (West, WESTLAWthrough 1999 1st Reg. Sess. & 2d Spec. Sess.).
104. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 30, § 1.8(c), at 54 (listing cases holding that when
homicide is defined as "unlawful killing," state bears burden of disproving self-defense).
105. See generally Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the
Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155 (1987).
106. See generally SloboinPsychiatricEvidence, supra note 23.
107. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 60 (1987); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898-
99 (1983); see also Daubert v. Merrdll Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) ("Vigor-
ous cross-examination, presentation of conrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.").
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pointed out,"°a such evidence is manifestly counterintuitive. This is because
both the law and laypeople assume that most people who commit crime are
sane and intend their actions"° and because we tend to believe that objective
circumstances are the best measure of what people think, feel, and act. All of
these are assumptions which defense-proffered expert testimony tends to
contradict.
I suspect that many enamored of the scientific way would not accept
either of the latter two definitions of reliability. A final construction of the
Daubert-Kumho holding, one that better resonates with empiricistprecepts but
is still entirely consistent with the approach just described, builds on the
scientific concept of incremental validity.110 That concept applied in the
expert testimony context would require proof that the proffered expert evi-
dence improves the accuracy of the decisionmaker. Under this approach, the
reliability of the evidence, by itself, is not necessarily dispositive of the admis-
sibility issue. For instance, testimony about the factors that detract from eye-
witness credibility, among the most valid types of social science testimony,"'
may nonetheless have low incremental validity if it tends to make jurors
believe, contrary to fact, that few eyewitnesses are right when they identify
the perpetrator of a crime." 2 In contrast, testimony about dangerousness, even
if associated with very high error rates," 3 may have good incremental validity
if it improves factfinders' ability to differentiate between those who will
recidivate and those who will not."4
108. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81 (discussing helpfulness of psychiatric testi-
mony).
109. The criminal law presumes sanity, LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 30, § 4.5(e), at 353,
and permits an inference that one intends the natural and probable consequences of one's acts,
id. § 3.5, at 225-26, and these assumptions "are undoubtedly shared by most people, including
the majority ofjurors and judges." Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence, supra note 23, at 43.
110. See David Faust & Barry Nurcombe, Improving the Accuracy of Clinical Judgment,
52 PsYCHIATRY 197, 202 (1989) (defining incremental validity as "the advantage gained by
adding a sign").
111. See Steven D. Penrod et al., ExpertPsychological Testimony on Eyewitness Reliabil-
iO' Before andAfter Daubert: The State of the Law and the Science, 13 BEHAV. SCL &L. 229,
256 (1995) (arguing that such testimony meets reliability requirements of Daubert).
112. Cf. People v. Enis, 564 NYE2d 1155,1165 (UL 1990) (upholding trial court's exclu-
sion of testimony on eyewitness identification because "[iut would be inappropriate for a jury
to conclude, based on expert testimony, that all eyewitness testimony is unreliable").
113. See MELTONET AL., supra note 28, at 281 tbl. 9.2 (showing false positive rates - i.e.,
rates at which predictions of dangerousness turn out to be wrong - from 44% to 99% in 13
studies).
114. As noted earlier, actuarial prediction tends to be superior to clinical (and therefore lay)
prediction. See supra note 50. Recent research on actuarial risk assessment permits relatively
precise prediction of the likelihood of recidivism (ranging from 0% to 58.5%) based on
relatively concrete characteristics (e.g., psychopathy, serious child abuse, substance use, prior
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Scientists could easily test each of these assertions through laboratory
and field research comparing "expert-informed" and "uninformed" juries. If
the informed and uninformed juries routinely agree in their conclusions about
the accuracy of eyewitnesses or the dangerousness of offenders, the expert
testimony would have no incremental validity. Consistent differences be-
tween the two groups, on the other hand, would confinm or disconfirm the
hypothesis that experts assist the factfinder.
B. Incremental Validity and Opinion Evidence on Past Mental State
Application of the incremental validity concept to opinion testimony
about past mental state is more problematic. Ideally, we could look at the
accuracy of past mental state verdicts from expert-informed juries and from
non-informed juries. Compared to the eyewitness and dangerousness scenar-
ios, however, clear criteria for determining the validity of a decision about past
mental state do not exist, for reasons that the reader by now should be able to
conjecture. Experimenters evaluating the incremental validity of information
about the foibles of eyewitnesses can, at least in the laboratory, be certain who
the actual perpetrator is and thus definitively determine whether the mock jury
decisions are "correct.""s Similarly, the accuracy ofpredictions ofdangerous-
ness can be relatively easily gauged either by monitoring the offender in
question or by having mock juries predict the likely recidivism ofpeople whose
offense history is already known." 6 Thus, whenthe expert-informed factfinder
and the uninformed factfinder differ in their conclusions in these two situations
we can tell which is right. In contrast, we have no easy way of determining
which group is correct about whether someone was "insane," lacked "mens
rea," or felt 'Justified," as those terms are now defined. As long as the law
talks aboutthe relevant mental states using terms such as "substantial inability
to appreciate or conform," "premeditation," "recklessness," and a "belief that
force was necessary" (rather than, say, in terms of IQ scores or "psychosis"),
arrests). See generally John Monahan et al.,Developing a Clinically UsefulActuarial Tool for
Assessing Violence Risk, 176 BRrr. J. PSYCHIATRY 99 (2000) (finding clinically useful actuarial
method to assist in violence risk assessment); Henry Steadnan et al., A Classification Tree
Approach to the Development ofActuarial Violent Risk Assessment Tools, 24 LAW & HUNL
BEHAV. 83 (2000). Provision of such information to the factfinder might permit a dramatic
improvement over lay judges' seat-of-the-pants predictions.
115. This is in fact standard methodology in eyewitness research. See Gary L. Wells, The
Scientific Status ofResearch on Eyewitness Identification, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
TBE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TEsTIMONY § 32-2.1.2, at 458-60 (David L. Faigman et al.
eds., 1997).
116. Both approaches (the latter called "cross-validation" research) have been used in vio-
lence prediction research. See John Monahan, The Scientific Status ofResearch on Clinical and
Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in I MODERN SCIENTIIC EVIDENCE, supra note 115, § 7-
2.1.2, at 313-14.
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ultimate judgements about insanity, mens rea, and the like are not easily
reducible to objectively verifiable components like physical acts are.
Put another way, ultimate judgments about subjectively defined past
mental state issues - in contrast to judgments about whether an act occurred -
are best described as moral and normative in nature, rather than scientific or
positive."' They are based on ideas of blameworthiness that come from many
different sources, including religion and intuition.1 Except at the margins,
assessing the relative "accuracy" of such normative judgements is an oxymor-
onic exercise. Perhaps this problem should lead us to abandon the effort at
making such judgments. 9 Until we do, those looking for scientific accuracy
are bound to be frustrated.
There is another type of incremental validity, however, that is more
susceptible to measurement, a type of incremental validity that might be called
"factor-based." To determine this type of validity, experimenters would
attempt to ascertain the factors or variables that ajury informed by an expert
considers in making decisions about mental state and then compare those to
the variables considered by a jury left to its own devices. 1X compared to the
uninformed jury, the informed jury considers more variables that the law
considers material to the past mental state issue in question, then factor-based
incremental validity of such evidence has been established.
117. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 448-49 ("[The ethical foundations of the
criminal law are rooted in beliefs about human rationality, deterrability, and free will [that are]
articles of moral faith rather than scientific fact"). At least one court has recognized this point
See Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ("Legal tests of criminal
insanity are not and cannot be the result of scientific analysis or objective judgment There is
no objective standard by which such a judgment of an admittedly abnormal offender can be
measured.").
118. See Stephen Golding, Mental Health Professionals and the Courts: The Ethics of
Expertise, 13 INT'L IL. & PSYCEIEATRY 281, 285 (1990) (arguing that notions of criminal
accountability "can be shown to be rooted in our Judeo-Christian conceptions of moral responsi-
bility").
119. Richard McFall, who has done interesting work in connection with assessing the
incremental validity of clinical judgments, see generally, e.g., Richard M. McFall & Teresa A.
Treat, Quantfyjng the Information Value ofClinical Assessmnents with Signal Detection Theory,
50 ANN. REV. PSYcHOL 215 (1999), has stated:
If the legal, medical, or psychological experts cannot even agree about whether
something (or someone) is an exemplar of a particular construct or category, then
the whole decision-making enterprise that employs such a construct or category
cannot be valid. These decision-making exercises are not "beyond science," on the
contrary, they are prime examples of the circumstances under which the application
of scientific principles can demonstrate that this specific type of decision-making
system lacks any validity. If it lacks validity, then there is every reason to challenge
the continuation of that decision-making process.
Electronic communication from Richard M. McFall to Christopher Slobogin (June 23, 2000)
(on file with author and Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Factor-based incremental validity is in some ways analogous to the idea
of moral progress recently described by Michael Shapiro. 2 Conceding that
the assertions of moral philosophy cannot be proven, he argues against skep-
tics who think that moral progress is therefore impossible by pointing to the
incremental usefulness of the new ways of thinking about old problems that
moral theorists generate. As he puts it, "[E]ven if experts and non-experts
are equal at the penultimate decision point, the skills of nonexperts may
nevertheless be aided by the experts' moral analyses." '' Ultimately, he
concludes: "The ideas of knowledge, expertise, and progress in moral inquiry
do not and cannot rest on a belief in an objective moral reality that always
provides firm and certain answers.'" There are no firm and certain answers
about the normative past mental state questions the law asks. But experts
may be able to provide laypeople with perspectives they otherwise would not
have, and that, in itself, could be said to add to the validity of the decisions
they make.
Under this final definition of reliability then, the admissibility of past
mental state evidence would depend more on the logical relevance of the
expert's aneedata than on its accuracy. Unless that information is demonstra-
bly wrong or so commonplace that it adds nothing to a bare recitation of the
facts, courts would admit it. Put in evidentiary language, material opinion
evidence usually would be considered probative as well, unless it is clearly
unreliable or it is not based on specialized (generally accepted) knowledge
that assists the factfinder in viewing the issues from a more-informed or dif-
ferent perspective. If that admissibility threshold seems porous, it at least is
bolstered by the necessity rationale and the defendant's right to voice.
Moreover, a requirement of factor-based incremental validity does make
a bow to the scientific reading of Daubert because it is based on the testable
issue of whether expert testimony on past mental state provides the factfinder
with more relevant information. To date, scientists have not conducted any
research testing this hypothesis. Perhaps Daubert-Kumho should be read to
require that such research be carried out."z A requirement of factor-based
incremental validity probably also would accelerate changes in the evaluation
and opinion formation process currently used by most forensic clinicians. For
instance, structured interview formats, designedto ensure that evaluators focus
120. See generally Michael H. Shapiro, Is Bioethics Broke?: On the Idea of Ethics and
Law "Catching Up" with Technology, 33 IND. L. REV. 17 (1999) (discussing whether law and
ethics have lagged behind science).
121. Id.at34.
122. Id.
123. My prediction is that such research would find a robust factor-based incremental val-
idity because, as earlier examples demonstrated, mental health professionals do usually attend
to a greater range of legally relevant variables than the typical layperson.
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on the variables that legal tests make relevant,124 should become increasingly
important.125 Furthermore, courts might insist that clinical experts address
particular factors.126 To this extent, then, the scientific method is clearly
applicable to the evaluation of and testimony about mental state at the time of
the offense.
Conclusion
Although this Article has focused on the admissibility of opinion evi-
dence about past mental state, it also has touched on two broad themes that
124. The best instrument of this typo developed to date is the R-CRAS (for Rogers Crim-
inal Responsibility Assessment Scales). The instrument calls for examination of thirty different
domains, such as reliability of the patient's self-report; level of intoxication at the time of the
offense; observable bizarre behavior at the time of the alleged offense; delusions, hallucinations
and thought disorders at the time of the alleged crime, general level of anxiety, depression and
verbal coherence at the time of the alleged crime; focus of the alleged ctime; behavior during
the week prior to the crime and so on. See R-CRAS MANUAL (1984) (on file with author). Al-
though the instrument does not (and cannot) produce a quantified assessment of sanity, MELTON
ET AL., supra note 28, at 233, it does structure an evaluation of mental state at the time of the
offense around relevant variables. See generally Richard Rogers & Kenneth W. Sewell, The
R-CRAS and Insanity Evaluations: A Re-Examination of Construct Validity, 17 BEHAv. SC.
& L. 181 (1999) (evaluating validity of R-CRAS).
125. Such instruments might also improve the inter-rater reliability of evaluations on past
mental state. Research using the R-CRAS, see supra note 124, shows very high reliability with
respect to decisions regarding the ultimate conclusion about sanity and gross level of function-
ing. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 229 tbl.8.2 (summarizing three studies by Rogers
et al., showing agreement approximating 82%, 93%, and 100% on sanity issue, and R-CRAS
MANUAL, supra note 124, at 13, showing inter-rater agreement of 87% for "loss of cognitive
control" and of 89% for "loss of behavioral control").
There are dangers in relying solely on such instruments, however. For instance, the R-
CRAS ignores psychodynamic (i.e., Freudian) variables that might help explain behavior. For
this reason, courts mightwantto require evaluators to use such an instrument, but not limit them
to it Furthermore, courts must also avoid the temptation to treat conclusions reached by a
clinician using the R-CRAS as "scientific." The instrument does not provide any scientific way
of measuring the variables it identifies, but merely directs the evaluator to rate them on a several
point scale. For instance, the item governing assessment of self-control over criminal behavior
asks the evaluator to judge whether the patient "[Wias in complete control of his/her behavior
and chose to commit the crime" ("no impairment"); "[Wias generally in control of his/her
behavior with only minor incidental losses of control" ("slight impairment"); "[C]hose to
commit the crime although it was done in an impulsive manner" ("mild impairment"); "[Llost
control of a significant portion of the criminal act after choosing to initiate criminal behavior"
("moderate impairment"), "[L]ost control over a significant portion of his/her criminal behavior
including the initial approach to the crime scene" ("severe impairment"); "[Wias completely out
of control of his/her behavior throughout all of the criminal act" ("extreme impairment"). R-
CRAS INs_ umENr, at 10 (on file with author).
126. Cf. Livingston v. State, 415 So. 2d 872,872-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (remanding
case because expert report did not address six statutory factors relating to competency to stand
trial).
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can be summarized in terms of two doubts about Daubert. The first doubt is
about Daubert-Kumho's explicit assertion that a scientific reliability test is
coherent in the legal context. As others have noted,"' law and science have
different aims, different methods of proof, and even different definitions of
truth. In that vein, it may be that evidentiary reliability should not be defined
without reference to factors other than accuracy. The second reservation is
that, even if a scientific reliability test is sometimes coherent in the legal con-
text, Daubert-Kumho's implicit assertion that it should be applied to every
type of expert testimony may not make sense. One does not have to subscribe
to the more radical versions of social constructivismlm to conclude that some
types of testimony - including opinion evidence of past mental state - may
never be proven valid in any truly scientific sense. 1t however, Daubert's
reliability threshold is defined conditionally, depending upon the type of
evidence at issue and its likely impact on the factfinder, then both doubts are
alleviated, if not resolved.
127. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is Science a Special Case? The Admissibility
ofScientfifcEvidenceAfter Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1779,1792 (1995) (noting
that in science "theories are judged by their usefulness in accommodating now observations, not
by their truth or falsity"); Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. I. ON LEGM. 329, 370
(1995) ("[S]cience seeks to be descriptive, positive, and predictive [while] law is normative and
its goal is justice, not descriptive accuracy.").
128. See David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy ofScience? The Para-
dox ofExperise and Interdisciplinariy in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685,752-
62 (2000) (discussing social constructivism in law).
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